Modelling TNE Directions in Asia

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Executive Summary:

This report addresses the development of transnational networks in Asia, new student mobility trends, and efforts to develop a pan-Asian education framework, namely via the harmonising of educational systems. In doing so, it takes stock of a number of observable international educational trends within the Asian region. The conclusions of this report, derived from a diverse body of statistics, point out a growing trend of intraregional collaboration and exchange that has made discernable a trend referred to as the Asianisation of Asia\(^1\).

Regional-level developments and challenges are discussed as well. They are framed and interpreted within the context of a macroeconomic development model: the Flying Geese model of industry development. This model seeks to capture and explain the evolution and proliferation of transnational education (TNE) networks now and in the future.

For the purposes of this report, the authors have not limited the term ‘TNE’ to mean only the provision of educational services by an institution of one country in another; rather, we adopt a broader interpretation of the term ‘TNE’. In its simplest form, this interpretation covers all four modes of service delivery in the education subsector as defined by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). TNE refers to education services that include: (i) cross border supply (e.g. e-learning); (ii) consumption abroad (e.g. student mobility); (iii) commercial presence (e.g. commercial facilities in a foreign country); and (iv) presence of natural persons (e.g. teachers working abroad). Given the broad definition put forward, we recognise that the term can be used interchangeably with the term ‘borderless higher education’. The purpose of this report is not to redefine the term itself, but to place the various educational exchanges it represents in a broad framework leading to a clearer analysis of evolving trends in this field.

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Modelling TNE Directions in Asia

Introduction and Background

There has never been a more important time to discuss Asian education. Volumes have been written on its origins, purpose and different manifestations, and the time is ripe for a fresh assessment. The groundbreaking pan-Asian framework for education proposed in 2008 by the former Prime Minister of Japan, Yasuo Fukuda, continues to find political support in the new Japanese Hatoyama government. The possibility of such a framework coming to fruition in the near future is only one reason to re-evaluate Asian education. The authors find it not only timely to revisit this subject, but also highly relevant in our attempt at understanding the motives and rationales that fuel this regional dynamo of development.

Development and its concomitant economic growth are certainly never far removed from the objectives of education. Many contemporary scholars have underscored the importance education plays as a driver of economic growth. This theory is not uncontested, however. Some have been criticised for drawing causality from what should otherwise be considered a matter of correlation. Resnik, for example, summarises Harbinson’s quantitative study on the matter and laconically concludes that quantitative relationships between human resources and economic development do not necessarily establish causality. Harbinson argues that “the data do not permit a conclusion that an increase of X% in second-level or higher education will result in a Y% increase in GDP per capita”. Finally, there are those that make bold claims in the intellectual tradition of the dependentistas, that a “strong association between levels of educational attainment and kilowatt hours consumed indicates—from one view of causality—that education is an important element of development and that its retardation is itself a guarantee of endless dependence”.

2 The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) at Waseda University, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency in the preparation of this report.


4 Joint Press Conference by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of Japan, Premier Wen Jiabao of the People’s Republic of China and President Lee Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea following the Second Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit Meeting on 10 October 2009: “I also stated that what will be indispensable for trilateral cooperation is exchanges among the youth of the three countries, in particular those among university students. As one aspect of university student exchanges, we should for example actively consider permitting the interchangeability among universities of credits earned. This would naturally require a degree of consistency in the levels of the schools concerned. While I do not consider this something that is possible for all universities, we will be promoting cooperation as qualitative levels are standardised. I proposed that through such cooperation, it would be possible for the various political and psychological hurdles still remaining among our three countries to be transformed and overcome”.

5 See for example, Olaniyan & Okemakinde (2008); Krueger & Lindahl (2001); Psacharopoulos & Woodhall (1985); Schultz (1961); and Kerr (2001).


Whether causality between education and economic growth can be empirically proven beyond a shadow of a doubt is not a central concern of this report. Of relevance, however, is the simple fact that, in the minds of policy makers in Asia, the link is clear: more education means more growth. This simple fact has important repercussions for a region that has seen its biggest gains in poverty alleviation in the last quarter century\(^\text{10}\).

The theory linking education and economic growth informs policies aimed within and between states in the Asian continent. Analysts conclude that policies favouring investments in education have been key to economic growth. The World Bank’s landmark publication, *The East Asian Miracle*, states that “education is the main theme of the story of the differences in growth between Sub-Saharan Africa and the East Asian high performers”\(^{11}\), thereby emphasising that lack of similar investments in other regions of the world have had negative repercussions. A quick look at policy goals for education directed by Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the Asia region serves to make the point.

In 1993, on the occasion of the First Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD I), the Japanese delegation presented an approach emphasising that human capital development was clearly feasible in other regions of the world and that Japan would do well to lead efforts to replicate its own successes beyond Asia:

> We recognise that the Asian experience of economic development and the catalytic role of international cooperation offer hope and provide a challenge for African economic transformation (…..) Over the past 30 years, in contrast to Africa, the countries of East and Southeast Asia have achieved high rates of growth in per capita income. We have also noted that the policy factors which contributed to the remarkable performance of East and Southeast Asia have included (…) (iii) long-term investment in education and human resource development as priority of development strategy\(^{12}\).

There has been significant continuity in this way of thinking. A decade later, Ryokichi Hirono, Chairman of the Initiative for Development in East Asia (IDEA), framed the issue as follows:

> Major domestic factors that have sustained [sic] remarkable record of economic growth in East Asian economies are among others, political stability, macroeconomic stabilisation, investment in human capital formation (…) centrality of Human-Centered Development and Growth with Equity, prioritising investment in human capital for growth and social equity for income distribution (…)\(^{13}\)

The Government of Korea, a more recent ODA donor, has also underscored the importance of human capital accumulation, with policies aimed specifically at human capital accumulation for economic growth finding their first clear articulation in the 4\(^{\text{th}}\)

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\(^{10}\) Between 1990 and 2004, more than 300 million persons crossed the US$1 a day poverty mark in East Asia and the Pacific. Data are retrieved from the World Development Indicators 2007, published by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. For more information see the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank (1993) *The East Asian Miracle*, New York: Oxford University Press.


Five-Year Economic Plan (1977-1981). This came about as a direct outgrowth of the ‘educational planning’ approach, which sought to regulate higher education based on labour force estimations—an approach popularised throughout the world in the 1950s. At that time, a sum of KRW 23 billion (approximately US$19.5 million) was invested in regional public universities to fulfil the estimated labour requirements of the state.

More recently, an OECD report likened the understanding most Koreans have of education vis-à-vis economic development to a “faith”, writing that:

Our visits to universities and colleges confirmed this emphasis: routinely, policy makers, administrators, and students spoke about education in terms of its economic value, and complaints about quality were very often complaints about the mismatch between education and labour market demands.

Elsewhere, we note that investments in education and training are touted as key to a successful economic track record in Vietnam, where growth rates in excess of 8% have been registered for the last three years. The OECD notes, “the government’s growth strategy emphasises the importance of education and human capital development”.

In the last few decades we have thus witnessed a clear shift in the stance governments in the region have adopted toward education at all levels, but mainly higher education. Today, it is clear that higher education is seen as a vital piece of the economic development puzzle in Asia. Technology, learning and innovation—to borrow from Kim and Nelson—were highlighted as the foundation for the resounding economic successes of the last 25 years and continue to fuel recent developments in higher education. This triad of principles is disseminating throughout the region in a circular fashion: from country to country governments have been building on each other’s lessons from experience.

For the purposes of this report, higher education institutions (HEIs) are grouped together in one broad category. Their role is understood in the same way Altbach describes the university: as an essential part of all modern societies; as politically important; as the source of ideas; as the quintessential institution of the new knowledge-based society of the twenty-first century; and at the same time, controversial, especially in transitional societies.

When discussing the role of higher education in the region we do not presume an artificial separation between education, power and state interests. Our point of departure echoes Marginson and Mollis’ opinion: “at the heart of comparative international education research, education intersects with power”. Thus, a distinction is drawn

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between government and institutional interests. Finally, we emphasise that any attempt to adequately capture the complex intersections of education and power in Asia must include the growing influence and importance of regional policy making bodies.

Recalling de Wit’s\textsuperscript{20} approach to the study of internationalisation processes in Europe and the United States, we submit our research to the following questions:

- How has the historical development of higher education been influenced by the processes of internationalisation and regionalisation in Asia?
- What can be said about the rationales for regionalisation in Asia; are they unique to this region? And how have these rationales been translated into policy-relevant strategies and approaches?
- How have the various transitions in higher education previously been conceptualised? Is there a need to offer a new conceptual model so as to better interpret new organisational models in higher education and the means by which they propagate?

Finally, in Section 3 we elaborate the applicability of the Flying Geese (FG) model of industry development to capture and explain the growing transnational networks that characterise cross-border education in Asia. The FG model is brought to the fore as a conceptual tool capable of illustrating the growth and promulgation of transnational networks in Asia based on the trade of education services.

1 Globalisation, Internationalisation and Regionalisation

In Asia, economic expansion and the associated wave of liberalisation policies set in motion in the 1980s forced the rigours of the market on education systems throughout the region in novel ways. As a result, new pedagogical industries have taken shape, and institutions with long histories are seeking to adapt to new global, regional and national realities. Like the economies of the region, a competitive environment now unites higher education systems in Asia. Underlying efforts to promote expansion and interdependence is an even greater need to build a secure environment in which socio-economic transactions can take place. Education is seen as an important tool in achieving this security and stability.

Situating Asian HEIs amidst the sweeping political and economic changes witnessed in recent times is no small task, and this report does not seek to offer a definitive answer to this challenge. Rather, we seek to nuance the discussion by focusing on the role of regional actors, which have gained a new importance in mediating the purpose and delivery of education across and within borders. Regionalisation is not so much a convergent or divergent trend as it is a complimentary one, and one that cannot be overlooked. Indeed, as Knight notes, “the “versus” approach is neither productive nor helpful”, in exploring the theme of regionalisation\textsuperscript{21}.

The following section will survey literature on globalisation, regionalisation, and internationalisation, as they constitute important elements of cross-border education research. It will follow with a survey of international organisations and international university associations, so as to capture and analyse existing activities that make up regional collaborative educational frameworks in the Asian region.

1.1 Internationalisation and Globalisation: Differences and Consensus

No proper discussion of regionalisation is possible without first exploring internationalisation and globalisation. Importantly, an uncontested definition of the terms has not yet emerged, thus contributing to a long debate among scholars and comparativists. A multitude of scholars have consequently contributed to the evolution of these meanings and definitions. That being the case, Knight’s final formulation benefits from some shared consensus.

Briefly, Knight posits that internationalisation is a process that sees the integration of “an international and intercultural dimension into the teaching, research and service functions of the institution”, highlighting the function of internationalisation as a transformative process expressed through the educational institution. Welch, continuing in the same direction as Knight, characterises globalisation as a myriad of knowledge and culture industries that are part and parcel of unfettered global competition. At the same time, Qiang’s critique is useful as it emphasises internationalisation as “not merely an aim in itself, but an important resource in the development of higher education”, both in regard to international standards and as a responsive tool in an era of globalisation.

Ebuchi, however, remains somewhat more ambiguous on the differences and interchangeability of the terms globalisation and internationalisation:

The objective of internationalisation may be an international coalition (globalisation) and... globalisation of higher education is almost equivalent to internationalisation of universities (...). It may be concluded that both terms are interchangeable and may be used with the same meaning.

Ebuchi understands internationalisation as a process; but it is a process for achieving globalisation, rather than coping with it. On the other hand, Van der Wende’s contribution serves to rescale Knight’s understanding of the internationalisation process, adding that internationalisation includes “any systemic effort aimed at making higher education responsive to the requirements and challenges related to the globalisation of societies, economy and labour markets”. In so doing, Van der Wende moves beyond Knight’s institution-based definition.

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There is a clear similarity between Van der Wende’s position – internationalisation as encompassing an effort to face the challenges of globalisation and the position adopted by Kitamura and later, Altbach. Kitamura argues, “internationalisation can be regarded as an effective way to respond to the impact of globalisation”\(^{28}\). Globalisation is iterated as a compendium of global forces brought to bear on the state and which the state must negotiate via, *inter alia*, its educational institutions. Similarly, Altbach and Knight suggested in 2007, that globalisation consisted of “the economic, political, and societal forces pushing 21st century higher education toward greater international involvement”\(^{29}\). They further note that internationalisation involves choices, whereas globalisation is an unalterable state unfolding before choices\(^{30}\).

In summary, de Wit pointed out the value of Knight’s definition: it emphasises internationalisation as a process and a response to globalisation, which includes both international and local elements\(^{31}\).

We conclude this brief overview with an operational understanding of the term *internationalisation*. In an attempt to reconcile the need to apply a definition of internationalisation to “many different countries, cultures and education systems”\(^{32}\), we offer our understanding of the term as follows: internationalisation is a process and/or a course of action resulting from deliberate choices made to cope with the influences and challenges of globalisation at various levels within and outside of the state (international, national, sector and institutional).

In Asia, internationalisation is also closely associated with the formation of the modern nation state. Significant strides in development and state-building were given added impetus with outward-looking strategies for human capital accumulation. Japan, China and Thailand, respectively, established Tokyo Imperial University (1877), Beijing University (1898) and Chulalongkorn University (1917), all with the aim of national development. Colonised countries, struggling through periods of resistance, finally submitted to a foreign-dominated internationalisation process in the name of nation-building. Student envoys were sent to learn foreign technology and consequently became the pioneers of the modern state. Examples of this can be found in both Meiji-era Japan and Qing China; added expenditures to support student envoys were common to both Japan and China at the turn of the 20th century.

In the post-War period, East Asia was mostly a region that sent students to the West, and international student mobility within the region was not very active until the first half of the 1980s. Seen as key to economic development and combined with the promise of economic growth, many countries in the region sought to establish their own ‘knowledge economies’, and internationalisation processes were seen as the fundamental building blocks of such economies. In this sense, internationalisation has sought to diversify the economies of the region, connecting them with and helping them negotiate the effects of globalisation. This rationale has become a mainstay of government thinking in the region and is, for the most part, echoed in the vision of university administrations.


1.2  Regionalisation: Harmonising Education Systems in Asia

The entangled and often volatile political, economic and cultural histories that underpin interstate relations within Asia arguably suggest that regional consensus is neither achievable nor even desired. Increasingly, however, integrated manufacturing and services sectors, transnational ecological and environmental challenges, and looming military and economic threats are focusing the attention of policy makers on the consequences—perhaps especially economically—of prospective volatility. Relations since the 1997 Asian financial crisis provide evidentiary support. In response to the crisis, countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Japan, China and South Korea, moved towards greater collaboration. This vision has been given political voice most recently by South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak, noting that “under the influence of globalisation, regional cooperation within Asia has become inevitable”\(^{33}\).

The progress made toward European regional integration in the 1980s was a further impetus to organise along similar lines, and sparked political discussions in the field of education about the role education played in stabilising relations in the region and ensuring overall growth and prosperity. As a direct result of these reflections, it was decided that education would become a main political issue in the integration of the region.

Even in the absence of clear political direction, higher education is regionalising, though the political processes necessary to bring about widespread consensus on issues of a regional scope have been comparatively slow to evolve. “Regional integration has been driven more by markets than by governments”, notes Giovanni Capannelli, Senior Economist at the Asian Development Bank, adding that “cooperation among national authorities is more recent and less intimate”\(^{34}\). Although we are able detect an evolution in policy statements dealing with cross-border education and exchange, these statements have been for the most part reactionary, following, rather than spurring developments in the region.

Yet policy makers are beginning to take action, and the harmonisation of higher education is now widely accepted as playing a vital role in regional integration. Whereas not long ago economic interdependency within the region was the only sign of regional integration, nowadays the region is better integrating education systems, with policy statements increasingly reflecting this new trend in international higher education. But, as SEAMEO RIHED noted, “the concrete mechanism to further promote regional integration in [sic] higher education sector to date has not yet been developed”\(^{35}\).

From a geographical standpoint, regional educational cooperation in Asia is developing along two axes: cooperation in the ASEAN region and in the Asia-Pacific. The regional frameworks for policy making and coordination, namely the ASEAN + 3 and East Asia Summits, both of which boast an increase in recent activities, do not yet include a formal agreement on pan-Asian educational cooperation. There is no question however that they are among the most important forums for the advancement of education harmonisation (see their policies in Appendix A).

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33 Choonsik, Y. (2009) “South Korea vows to get closer to Asian neighbours”, Reuters, 1 June.
In the late 1990s the first timid steps of structured student exchanges became apparent, with the notion of “people-to-people exchange” for development and mutual understanding gathering more momentum in the early 2000s. Given the emerging support towards these policy aims, thinking in regards to the extent in which higher education systems in the region can cooperate is becoming more refined and ambitious. The 4th East Asia Summit may usher in the most ambitious of policy statements yet: a pan-regional student mobility plan. If such a framework is adopted in the meetings of ASEAN + 3 or in the East Asia Summit, it will not only be the first educational framework to be embedded there, but the first education framework to cover the entire Asia region.

However, significant obstacles remain in the way of establishing such a framework. A principle issue of contention is the composition of nation states which might fall under such an umbrella mechanism. Some argue that a Pacific focus automatically validates the presence of countries in Oceania, while others adopt an interpretation more narrow in scope, seeking to cover only the ASEAN + 3 countries. Regardless, a pan-Asian education framework would be first and foremost, much like its European counterparts, ERASMUS, SOCRATES and the Bologna Process, a human resource strategy for securing competitiveness in world markets and in relation to human resources of other regions. It would also aim to: (i) develop the international market of regional higher education; (ii) build confidence in Asian education, while raising public awareness; and (iii) share a vision of diversity and equal opportunity for education throughout Asia.

This final point echoes one of the objectives of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration (see table above): promoting education exchange for “deeper knowledge and understanding so as to fight intolerance and improve understanding among cultures and civilisations”36. This objective may be little more than verbose politicking; but then again, it is by far the most difficult achievement to analyse in some measurable form. Kerr captures the difficulty in ascertaining the usefulness of the mutual understanding approach by recounting a conversation among participants of an international colloquium on cross-cultural awareness:

Participants in an international colloquium a few years ago asked, “How much can cultural relations really achieve?” They concluded, “In one aspect, cultural relations,” that is, exchanges in education, arts, science, and information, “can do very little. They certainly cannot overcome or deflect major historical events or eliminate acute power conflicts. But, they are the chief means to shape the future of men and nations, to change their directions through creative mutual borrowing, and to strengthen an awareness of shared values37.

To be sure, the impetus for the formation of an “East Asian Community” is the unification and interdependence of economies. It is symbolic that Japan sought to publically acclaim the merits of an East Asian Community on the same occasion it signed its first Free Trade Agreement (FTA)38. It may very well be that, in the field of education cooperation policy makers favour objectives of mutual understanding, but a quick

36 See, First East Asia Summit and the 9th ASEAN + 3 Summit, in Appendix A.
38 The Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement was signed on 13 January 2002, and constitutes Japan’s first Free Trade Agreement. It should be noted that under the section entitled “Facilitating Movement of Natural Persons”, specific mention is made to promote the exchange of students, scholars and teachers.
analysis of economic policies and political orientations leaves one hard-pressed to sustain such a claim. Competitive and aggressive negotiations over deregulation and protectionism have been a stalwart feature of the discussions on an East Asian Community and do not reflect positively on the achievement of mutual understanding objectives. A case in point is made in a series of publications on the theme of *Understanding Korean Education*, published by the Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI), and devoted specifically to understanding higher education. It opens with this statement:

> The increase in trade between countries as promoted by the WTO and the FTA [sic] is the main driving force of cross-country exchange for higher education [italics added] and, in the education service sector, higher education is the main negotiation target\(^{39}\).

It is possible, therefore, that as a corollary to market-driven harmonisation, the desire for mutual understanding still has merit and cannot be fully discounted as a policy aim. However, it certainly cannot be emphasised as the primary policy objective.

Thus the global is not separate from the national or the regional; they are not mutually exclusive realms of interaction. Indeed, it is very much because of the effects of globalisation that problems and potentialities, in every domain, have increased exponentially. “Globalisation is expressed in our apprehension of new and increasingly complex patterns of interconnectedness,” claims Gough, defining these patterns as “cultural processes that destabilise relationships between social organisation and the spaces and places in which technologies, materials, media, and meanings are produced, exchanged, and consumed”\(^{40}\). Although internationalisation processes seek to deal with the challenges of globalisation at the national level, the increasing interconnectedness of economies—and now education systems—have given rise to a need for a regional-level backstopping mechanism with regulatory function.

The “mutual understanding” policy aims deserve a sober re-evaluation, ensuring the stated aims are not passing for so-called ‘red herrings’, reorienting educational agendas strictly in favour of market imperatives. Limits must be placed on the market’s reach into a traditionally public domain. The benefits of an East Asian Community must be shared equally and a regional mechanism should be put in place to ensure this is so. This is most especially true in the field of education.

Regional harmonisation of higher education carries the potential to exacerbate or reduce disparities: it can be a force for the equalisation of opportunities or the means for allowing differences in initial endowments to flourish\(^{41}\). TNE policies should aim at redistributing Asian intelligence and know-how, promoting capacity-building to narrow human capital gaps and more generally ensuring that these developments grow in a healthy way.

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1.3 Exploring Collaborative Regional Educational Frameworks in Asia

Research on educational policies has basically aimed to cover the decision-making process related to educational policies at the national and increasingly, decentralised local levels. With the inclusion of education services in the World Trade Organisation, inroads have recently been made with regard to research on global-level decision-making processes. Yet excepting Europe—where significant progress has been made in regional integration—research on the regional-level decision-making processes or frameworks in the field of educational development has not garnished much attention in international educational policy research; this is also the case in Asia.

In 1973, UNESCO made some inroads in recognising the importance of regionalised networks in supporting ‘local’ growth; that is, endogenous development not determined, prescribed or dominated by Western influence. In Asia, this took the form of the Asian Centre of Educational Innovation for Development (ACEID), later renamed the Asian Programme of Educational Innovation for Development (APEID). Drawing on significant institutional independence, APEID was able to develop targets and methodologies uniquely suited to its role in the Asia region. Since then, a number of regional organisations with a mandate in education and espousing similar principles have been established in Asia; and just as APEID has been forced to adapt its mechanisms, strategies and tools to meet the expectations and challenges of changing times, contexts and priorities, so too, have they. ASEAN, however, began the promotion of regional integration of higher education systems only in the 1990s.

Within ASEAN, discussions on the issue of regional integration have taken firm root only within the last 10 years. Increasing efforts are being made in this regard, as evidenced by the “ASEAN + 3 Study Group on Facilitation and Promotion of Exchange of People and Human Resources Development”, put forth as a policy measure in the Report of the East Asia Study Group (EASG) in 2002. Led by Japan, the group sought to promote cooperation amongst ASEAN countries, Japan, China and Korea with the overall aim to promote academic exchange in all segments of higher education, to establish “Centres of Excellence” and to harmonise curriculum among interested institutions. Yet the fact that the First East Asia Summit was not held until 2005 suggests that there is mismatched interest between policy and practice towards a regional framework, including within the education sector.

This section focuses on 10 organisations—a mix of international organisations and university associations, divided according to member affiliations and target regions—which are considered to have particular relevance in any discussion on collaborative educational frameworks in Asia: ASEAN; SEAMEO; APEC; UNESCO; ADB; AUN; AUN/SEED-Net; APRU, UMAP and APQN.

Turning first to member affiliations, the 10 divide into two groups. Firstly, members of ASEAN, SEAMEO, APEC, UNESCO and ADB are represented by national
governments, whereas members of organisations such as AUN, AUN/Seed-Net, APRU, UMAP and APQN are comprised of universities and academic institutions. Moreover, within the same university network, organisations such as AUN and APRU have established limits to their membership, targeting ‘top’ universities, whereas membership is a function of a wider range of universities in organisations such as UMAP.

These 10 organisations can also be understood according to the regions they target. Organisations such as ASEAN, SEAMEO, AUN and AUN/Seed-Net base their activities in the ASEAN region. By contrast, APEC, APRU, UMAP, APQN and UNESCO are organisations that target the Asia-Pacific region on a broader scale. UNESCO is a global organisation, whereas the UNESCO-Asia Pacific Regional Bureau for Education promotes regional activities, including activities in South and Central Asia. Although the ADB draws members from developed countries outside the region, the scope of its activities substantively corresponds to those of UNESCO.

There are other ways of categorising the organisations above; for example, it is possible to focus instead on target sectors and institutional mission. What we observe however, by grouping these organisations into categories is that within the regional higher education framework in Asia, universities and evaluation institutions interact in a complementary way with government organisations. For instance, not only is the AUN the main university network in ASEAN, but it is also charged with overseeing the entire regional higher education sector of the ASEAN region. Similarly, the APQN, a non-governmental private international institution, plays an important policy making function.

By quickly outlining these organisations according to target sectors and operational missions, we conclude that there are institutions which target education as one of the sectors of regional integration or one of the various development sectors. Other institutions focus more specifically on the promotion of regional exchanges between universities or the promotion of quality assurance in higher education. This is evidence that such frameworks are multi-layered, playing a complementary role with one another and within internationalisation processes.

2 Trends in Higher Education Collaboration within Asia and their Significance for TNE

In Asia, relationships of economic interdependence are growing, as is the case in much of the rest of the world. Although Asian economies are heavily dependent on global markets and knowledge flows, we observe a distinct reorientation away from traditional centres of dominance to intra-regional collaborative networks. Education systems seem to mimic the market in this respect, with new networks of cooperation and student mobility trends distinguished by patterns of strengthened intra-regional cooperation. Watanabe verifies the “East Asianisation of East Asia” in an analysis of interaction amongst the Asian economies. Based on his analysis of trade within and outside the region, Watanabe argues that “the most significant challenge now in Asia is whether this de facto economic integration can further develop into a systematic framework or not”\(^{45}\). In a similar way, de facto integration exists with regard to higher education systems in the region, prompting considerations as to if, and when, a regional mechanism for higher education will be put in place to regulate its expansion.

This section will consider student mobility patterns in Asia, and patterns formed by inter-university partnerships and transnational programmes (TNPs). We insist on a note of caution with regard to the use of the terms “Asia,” “East Asia,” and “South and West Asia” in the following section. Many of the statistics provided below are drawn from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) Data Centre, UIS Education Digests and UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks. The UIS has revised its definition of regions from year to year. In some instances countries that make up certain regions have been combined to ensure consistency throughout the years being compared. Moreover, because much of the data from China—necessary when looking at higher education exchange in Asia—is missing in UNESCO’s tabulations, the Educational Statistics Yearbook of China is an additionally used data source.

According to the latest UNESCO statistics, tertiary education gross enrolment rates in China, from 1999 to 2006, increased from 6% to 22%. Enrolment rates in Japan and South Korea (already quite high in 1999), increased respectively from 45% to 57%, and 66% to 93%, thus signifying a significant surge in enrolment rates of major Northeast Asian countries within a short period of time.

**Figure 1: Number of Internationally Mobile Students in Asia and the Pacific (by sending region 2001-06)**

From the data presented in Figure 1, we note that of the approximately 507,000 internationally mobile students in the Asia-Pacific region in 2006, 333,000 originate from another country within the region—some 66% of the total. The number of students arriving from other regions in 2006 was pale in comparison, with only 50,000 students coming from South and West Asia, 34,000 from North America and Western Europe and

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46 In the UNESCO Institute for Statistics’ Education Digest for 2004, Asia comprised 50 countries; in 2005, it comprised 50, but they were further sub-divided into West and East Asia; in 2006 East Asia and the Pacific comprised 34 countries, with Central, South and West Asia each including nine countries.


48 Ibid.


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11,000 from Sub-Saharan Africa. Verbik and Lasanowski note that “Asian nations overwhelmingly provide Japan with most of its overseas enrolments”, as they have for several years, an analysis which holds true for many other countries in the region\textsuperscript{50}.

It is interesting to note, however, that between 2001 and 2006 the number of students from Sub-Saharan Africa was consistently larger than those from Arab States. This is likely due to a reorientation of ODA policies by many East Asian governments seeking to build stronger ties with Africa as a whole; Japan, through its Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) initiatives and China, through its “Go Global” strategies, for example. Zhu notes that Africans now make up 25\% of China Scholarship Council awards\textsuperscript{51}. Moreover, in his opening address at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) during the 2006 Beijing Summit, President Hu Jintao stated:

To forge a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership and strengthen our cooperation in more areas and at a higher level, the Chinese Government will (…..) over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; (…..) and increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from the current 2,000 per year to 4,000 per year by 2009\textsuperscript{52}.

Figure 2: Percentage of International Students in Asia by Region (2001-06)

Yet despite greater ties with Africa, the focus remains on attracting students from within the region and as well, when possible, from traditionally dominant Western countries.


\textsuperscript{52} Address by President Hu Jintao at the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 4 November. Last accessed 10 May 2009.
It is worth noting that, with few exceptions, countries in the Asia region have all registered important increases in the number of international students within their borders in the past quarter century. This growth is to a large extent fuelled by a correlated increase in the number of students being sent abroad by neighbouring countries in the region. For example: while the number of international students accepted to Japanese HEIs increased by approximately 115,000 students between 1986 and 2006—an eight-fold increase—figures in Table 3 show that Japan also boasts a four-fold increase in the number of students it has sent abroad for the same period: approximately 42,000 more. Similar patterns apply to other countries in the region; South Korea for instance.

Such data thus suggest that the tremendous growth in Asian student mobility is a circular pattern of knowledge flows, propagated through student exchange and made possible through greater collaboration between education systems. This heightened collaboration is one significant factor leading us to claim that a certain degree of de facto integration is observable, despite the lack of a political and regulatory framework necessary to claim de jure integration.

Table 1: Inbound Mobile Students to Asian Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>6,174****</td>
<td>41,211****</td>
<td>162,695***</td>
<td>37.461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1,309 *</td>
<td>2,143 **</td>
<td>22,260 ***</td>
<td>17.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>14,960 *</td>
<td>53,511 **</td>
<td>130,124 ***</td>
<td>8.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>15,740 *</td>
<td>42,415 **</td>
<td>207,264 ***</td>
<td>13.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2,959 *</td>
<td>5,556 *</td>
<td>40,774 ***</td>
<td>13.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4,640 *</td>
<td>4,964 **</td>
<td>5,136 ***</td>
<td>1.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>40,029 ***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7,589 ***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2,053 ***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What is clear is that the staggering growth of student exchange in this region is not driven by a new and statistically significant influx of students from the West. Rather, it points to the fact that HEIs in Asia have a capacity for growth that was hitherto left untapped, a recognition which, along with the perceived economic, social and cultural benefits of hosting international students has led government officials to more seriously consider the possibility of establishing a comprehensive regional framework for higher education. Thus governments have taken notice of a phenomenon and are now seeking to regulate it—not the opposite.
Table 2: Outbound Mobile Students from Asian Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>53,378</td>
<td>115,871</td>
<td>417,351</td>
<td>7.819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>25,978</td>
<td>69,739</td>
<td>101,913</td>
<td>3.923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>17,926</td>
<td>62,324</td>
<td>60,225</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>2,468</td>
<td>2.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,573</td>
<td>2,480</td>
<td>1.5766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>14,156</td>
<td>22,136</td>
<td>33,904</td>
<td>2.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>2,206</td>
<td>2.515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>39,980</td>
<td>49,413</td>
<td>45,195</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>2,911</td>
<td>3.907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4,994</td>
<td>5,107</td>
<td>7,916</td>
<td>1.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>7,539</td>
<td>18,087</td>
<td>20,322</td>
<td>2.696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>8,649</td>
<td>17,093</td>
<td>24,082</td>
<td>2.784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>5,342</td>
<td>6,299</td>
<td>23,160</td>
<td>4.335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Improvements in the quality of higher education, a greater number of programmes taught in English, and the increasingly internationalised campuses are all reasons lending themselves to decisions to pursue higher education at home, rather than abroad. Or, as Stromquist and Monkman suggest, “while the world is becoming . . . smaller and more homogeneous at some levels”, some see an opportunity to rescue local identities and some even to rediscover them. Government leaders and university strategists appeal with equal enthusiasm to, among other things, the unique character and strength of Asianess and ASEANness, as the case may be, to encourage students to stay at home, or at least within the region.

If governments have only recently begun reacting to this shift in student mobility trends, institutions have proven to be much more responsive. Not only are they studying these new trends—in many instances they are key contributors of statistical data—but many were also early implementers of dynamic internationalisation strategies now facilitating student mobility in the region. In the cases of Korea, Japan, and China, we note that inter-university agreements have increased a great deal and that these increases often precede steep rises in incoming student mobility.

A. Japan

Commenting on Japan’s post-Meiji internationalisation strategy, Yamamoto remarked that it was composed of a rather disparate network of academics nurturing lingering collaborations with researchers abroad. University internationalisation was “dependent

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upon personal networks” and “individual-level activities”, which resulted in relatively weak and unconnected activities, a practice that “is no longer viable” today\(^{55}\).

Having borrowed heavily from Western models of higher education both before and after the Second World War (WW2), Japan was more likely to emulate Western models of research than most countries in the region. Internationalisation, as it was then understood, was for the most part limited to individual channels of intellectual exchange. Yet the ephemeral nature of the Japanese higher education system post WW2 meant that pure emulations of Western education models and practices, when they occurred, never lasted very long in their original form.\(^{56}\). Rather, the Japanese government assumed of importance in leading reform and development. Under the direction of the Meiji Government, Japan opened the doors of what would later become the first modern national university which was at this point, linked to the creation of a bureaucracy for the nation. Even the private universities that emerged after 1919—when the Japanese government recognised them as institutions at the collegiate level—came under the patriarchal influence of the government\(^{57}\). It would be disingenuous, therefore, to suggest that internationalisation in the context of Japanese HEIs was undertaken with no involvement or direction of the government and its ministries.

Yet by the same token, the more recent spikes in student mobility cannot be attributed entirely to government leadership. Harman noted that with the introduction of major administrative reforms in 2001, “increased autonomy was given to national research institutions and national universities (...)”\(^{58}\). In Figures 3 and 4, we note that Japanese universities have taken a leading role in promoting transnational linkages with HEIs throughout the world, with a specific emphasis on the Asia region. The proportion of inter-university agreements signed by Japanese HEIs was relatively equally distributed among the regions of the world until the early 1990s. Thus in 1991, the number of inter-university agreements between Japanese institutions and HEIs in Asia (72), North America (68), South America (70) and Europe (64) stood at relative parity. Such figures suggest a relatively equal interest on behalf of Japanese HEIs to connect with various regions in the world. We verify this assumption by looking at the sum of inter-university agreements by region in 1991. As of 1991, Japanese HEIs had accumulated 588 inter-university agreements with institutions in Asia, 59 in Oceania, 674 in North America and 431 in Europe. Agreements with HEIs in the Arab region (5) and the Africa region (15) remained significantly lower.

However, in 1996 the tide began to change in a more apparent way, and we begin to note a stronger bias toward intra-regional partnerships. That year, Japanese HEIs signed 259 inter-university agreements with HEIs in Asia, 97 with HEIs in North America, 104 with HEIs in South America and 118 with HEIs in Europe. This brought regional


totals to 1,336 inter-university agreements with Asian HEIs, 1,144 with North American HEIs, 99 with South American HEIs and 955 with European HEIs.

Latest statistics for inter-university agreements suggest more than telling bias in favour of intra-regional collaboration. With respect to the regions outlined above, the sum of inter-university agreements Japanese HEIs signed was 6,058 in Asia, 2,708 in North America, 286 in South America and 3,463 in Europe. (That being the case, inter-university agreements with HEIs in the Oceania region made steady gains between 1991 and 2006, growing from 59 to 695 agreements.)

**Figure 3: New Inter-University Agreements in Japan by Region**

**Figure 4: Accumulated Inter-University Agreements in Japan Country**

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60 Ibid.

61 The accumulated figures have been manually tabulated. It is possible that some university agreements have expired and have not been renewed. This would imply a downward revision of the totals presented.
Linkages between Japanese HEIs and those from the ASEAN region, based on inter-university agreements, thus began to flourish in the early 1990s. Responsible for the exponential growth in partnership agreements in the Asia region as a whole are the linkages with Chinese and Korean HEIs in particular. In 2006 inter-university agreements with Chinese HEIs accounted for 42.3% of total, while Japanese inter-university agreements with Korean HEIs represent a similarly high proportion—some 24.2%. In comparison, Thailand and Indonesia (the two leading countries in inter-university agreements from the ASEAN region) respectively hold 7.5% and 4.6% of the 2006 total. Singapore and Malaysia registered among the lowest levels of activity with respect to inter-university agreements signed with Japanese HEIs: 1.3% (82 agreements) and 1.2% (75 agreements) respectively.

This pattern of increased intra-regional cooperation is verified in the number of new TNPs established between Japanese HEIs and those in other parts of the world. Figures 5 and 6 show that while the number of TNPs established between 1988 and 2008 have steadily risen, not every region can boast comparable rates of activity. Figure 7 clearly shows that between 1988 and 1996 there were relatively few other regions that were actively engaging Japanese HEIs in TNPs, aside from HEIs based in the US.

**Figure 5: New TNPs in Japan by Region**

![New TNPs in Japan by Region](image)

The Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) estimates that 2,948 inter-university agreements were still in force in Japan as of 2006. See MEXT for more information.

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To summarise, the data presented in Figures 3-6 suggest that since 2001 internationalisation activities in Asia have increased at a faster rate in comparison to other regions. Moreover, the pace of recent intra-regional internationalisation efforts in Asia are unmatched by any other region and for the most part, is HEI-led.

These heightened internationalisation efforts have had multiple effects on student mobility in Asia. A more rigorous statistical analysis would be necessary to prove a clear correlation between the increased number of inter-university agreements and TNPs, and concomitant rises in intra-regional mobility; yet, the data in Figures 7-9 present sufficient evidence to draw some initial conclusions.

In 1978, 1,132 international students pursued studies in a Japanese HEIs. Of these, 676 (59.7%) originated in Asia. Between 1978 and 2006, the number of overseas students from Asia studying in Japanese HEIs grew to 19,569, representing 91.3% of the total number of overseas students (21,431) registered in Japan in 2006, and a 29-fold increase over an 18-year period. In the same period, inter-university agreements between HEIs in Japan and the rest of Asia increased 15-fold, from 406 to 6,058 inter-university agreements. As shown in Figure 8, the most important increases came from overseas students originating in China and Korea.

Figure 6: Accumulated TNPs by Region\textsuperscript{63,64}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure6.png}
\caption{Accumulated TNPs by Region\textsuperscript{63,64}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} NB: Australia is included in the category “Asia”.

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Overseas students from ASEAN member countries are increasingly present in Japanese HEIs. Discounting the presence of Korean and Chinese international students, between 1989 and 2007 the number of overseas students from Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia increased substantially between 1989 and 2007—191%, 238% and 218%, respectively. Also worth noting is the 38-fold increase in the number of Vietnamese students in Japan over the same period.

Remembering the Nakasone Government’s plan, put forward in 1983, to attract 100,000 international students by 2000\(^{67}\), and the most recent student mobility scheme aiming to attract 300,000 international students to Japan’s higher education system by 2020\(^{68}\), the Japanese government clearly has a vested interest in seeing the above-presented numbers continue to grow.


\(^{66}\) Ibid.


B. Korea

Korean education is described as resilient, spectacular and dynamic, among other things, with the OECD deeming it “astonishingly impressive” in its *Thematic Review of Tertiary Education*. Explosive growth is Korea’s number of institutions is indeed impressive; not only did the number of higher education institutions in Korea increase from 142 to 411 between 1970 and 2004, but tertiary education enrolment rates over the same period expanded from 201,436 to 3,555,115. Moreover, the UK’s Dearing Report (1997) claimed that with the introduction of new government policies dating back to 1987, the Korean higher education system had made significant progress towards institutional autonomy:

Many of the recent changes in Korean higher education, dating from the 1987 University Autonomy Plan, have increased the autonomy particularly of private sector institutions which previously were subject to detailed control by the Ministry of Education.

Yet others suggest that the structure and administration of higher education in Korea remained based on “authoritarian interaction patterns” as late as 1999, furthermore arguing that unless it changed from a closed system into a natural or open one, Korean higher education would “continue to function as a mechanical bureaucratic organisation”.

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69 Ibid.
72 The Report of the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, chaired by Sir Ron Dearing.
Historically, Korean higher education is indeed characterised by strong centralised control. During the Japanese occupation (1910-45), Korean higher education was relegated to the ‘training of elites’—a practice borrowed directly from the Japanese mode de faire. The only university in Korea during this period was consequently Keijo Imperial University (established by the Japanese in 1924), which predominantly educated Japanese expatriates and state bureaucrats. All other higher education institutions were generally viewed with suspicion as training grounds for possible independence movements and “were downgraded to three-year, non-degree-granting institutions” 76.

Post-occupation, economic growth became eminently important to Korean leaders, and to this end, the Japanese modus operandi—linking human capital development to education—found its way into policy circles 77.

With US higher education models influencing Korean education at the same time, HEIs endured tight legislative and regulatory controls up until the early 1990s. What economic growth there was turned out to be significantly hamstrung by the government’s heavy-handed involvement in the higher education sector:

Although the scope and extent of legislative control differs between national/public and private institutions of higher education, it is pervasive in nearly all aspects of higher education policies. (…..) It is difficult to find a pattern of government control as pervasive and stringent in any other democratically oriented nation 78.

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis marked a considerable turning point, however, in the government’s approach to the higher education system. A main objective for the post-Crisis government was to bolster a critically needed knowledge-driven economy. Building on the 1987 reforms with this in mind, the government became significantly more supportive of institution-led internationalisation (and corporatisation). Extra latitude—which came in the form of greater autonomy to manage administrative affairs, private sector partnerships and discretionary power with respect to the composition of the student body and human resource management—was consequently afforded to Korean HEIs by the turn of the 21st century, enabling them to respond more effectively to the needs of a country working towards the creation of a knowledge economy.

Today, Korean higher education is largely made up of private HEIs: approximately 97% 79. As a whole, Korean higher education accommodated 17,223 more overseas students in 2007 than it did in 2000, representing a 10-fold increase 80. Of these 17,223 new international students, 14,386 (83.5%) originated in one country alone: China.

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77 In respect to human capital development aims, Kim writes: “Since the execution of the 1st National Economic Development Plan in the early 1960s, the South Korean government has regarded higher education as a prime motivator for the extension of national power as well as for the promotion of national industrialisation”. See Kim, J. (2000) “Curriculum and Management”, J. C. Weidman & N. Park (Eds.) Higher Education in Korea: Tradition and Adaptation, New York: Falmer Press.


80 Based on a comparison of international students in Korea between 2000 and 2007; the total number of international students in one country alone: China.
Figure 11 shows that between 1987 and 2007 (and especially between 2002 and 2007), no other country was able to match China’s international student flow to Korean HEIs.

Sending the next two most significant students flows to Korean HEIs in 2007 were Japan and Vietnam—respectively, 1,212 (6.3%) and 962 (5%) students. In stark contrast to the rate of growth registered by incoming students from China (a 17-fold increase), the number of international students from the US grew by just over 200%, from 222 students to 487 students. That being the case, if discounting incoming students from the Asia region, Europe and North America represent the most important regional sources of international students for Korea.

**Figure 10: International Students in Korea by Region**

**Figure 11: International Students in Korea by Region (not including Asia)**

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82 Ibid.
Recalling the significant changes adopted in the approach to higher education in Korea and the extra flexibility HEIs were afforded post-1997, it is not surprising to find vigorous growth in transnational networking efforts over the past decade. Figure 12 details that these transnational networks are once again, most active within the Asia region; between 2001 and 2007, Korean HEIs established a total of 70 TNPs with HEIs based in Asia. By the same token, Figure 13 reveals that TNPs with Asian HEIs accounted for just less than 50% of the TNP total in 2008.

Breaking down the ‘Asia’ category, Korean HEIs have been most active in establishing TNPs with China (50) and the US (43). Bilateral growth with US and Chinese HEIs has increased steadily, and it is for this reason that the total number of TNPs has increased so significantly. A record number of programmes were established between Chinese and Korean HEIs in 2006—13 in total—while 2007 proved to be a year of vigorous growth for US/Korean collaboration, with US and Korean HEIs introducing 12 new TNPs in 2007.

As shown in Figure 12, the proportion of TNPs established with HEIs from ASEAN member countries remains low. Between 2001 and 2008, only four TNPs with Singapore and Vietnam—both ASEAN member countries—had been established with Korean institutions. By contrast, 22 new TNPs were established between European and Korean HEIs over the same period.

**Figure 12: New TNPs in Korea by Country**

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83 This figure excludes the five transnational programmes established with Australian HEIs.
84 Raw data provided in personal correspondence with the KEDI. Receipt: April 2009.
Ma argues that the “process of regional cooperation is in fact not equal for all, and Asia boasts many examples of unequal access to the regionalisation process” and to be sure, the structures, both political and administrative, necessary to facilitate the creation and maintenance of transnational networks are more developed in Europe than in the ASEAN region\textsuperscript{87}. Steps are, however, being taken to rectify this, including in Korea\textsuperscript{88}.

The Korean higher education system is under significant government pressure to improve research quality and outputs so as to compete with the US and other dominant education systems. A number of government initiatives were introduced over the years to strengthen graduate education (Brain Korea 21, or BK21) and to attract foreign students to Korean HEIs (The Study Korea Project). For the most part, government leadership in the area of internationalisation is witnessed in the form of research grants to “Centres of Excellence”, and the easing of legal barriers to international exchange.

In 1999, the influx of KRW 1.4 trillion (US$ 1.19 billion)\textsuperscript{89} promised to bring about a wide swathe of changes to the Korean higher education system. However, Lee notes that some academics charge the Korean Government of using these projects as a means to retain control of higher education, citing in particular the many prerequisites a Korean HEI must meet in order to be eligible for funding under the new priority-funding schemes. So, while we underscore the importance of HEIs in the internationalisation process and the renewed vigour with which they are establishing transnational linkages, we are also reminded of the overarching control the government maintains over the entire internationalisation enterprise.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Australia included as ‘Asia’.
\textsuperscript{88} ASEAN University Network (2007) Memorandum of Understanding, ASEAN-China Academic Cooperation and Exchange Programme.
\textsuperscript{89} Exchange rates for all local currencies current as of 17 December 2009. Exchange rates as listed on www.xe.com.
C. China

Huang states: “During the process [of internationalisation], academic patterns from Europe, Asia, and the Pacific region, as well as from America, have significantly affected Chinese higher education”\(^{90}\). The statistics in this section will show this to be true, especially with regard to student mobility and TNP\(s\) in China. The inverse is also true, however; without a doubt the ‘China factor’ has been the greatest influence on higher education systems in Asia and increasingly, in other parts of the world.

Given that in 2007, China was the most populous nation (1,318 million) and registered the 4th highest GDP in the world (US$ 3,205.51 million), China’s 7% of share of the global student market is set to increase by leaps and bounds\(^{91}\). Thus in China’s case, the oft-repeated economics maxim holds true for education: if China sneezes, the rest of the world will likely catch a cold.

There are a number of similarities between the evolution of the Chinese higher education system and that of its Asian neighbours. In a first instance, over two decades before Korea embarked on its 4th Five-Year Economic Plan, Chinese bureaucrats were already implementing educational planning initiatives based on manpower forecasts in their own series of five-year economic plans. During this period (1953-1957), writes Min, “students represented products in a centrally planned economy”\(^{92}\). The manpower planning approach lasted well into the 20\(^{th}\) century, only to be nuanced by a more market-oriented approach to education planning beginning in the late 1970s. Yet, the market-oriented approach has not dislodged the manpower approach; rather, it aims to achieve it by different means.

Also, China’s role in spreading the principles of Confucian education was important in shaping education systems in the region. For example, the roots of the Confucian principles arguably underpin much of the “education fever” witnessed nowadays in Korea, with some\(^ {93}\) suggesting that the influence of Confucianism in education is much more meaningful in Korea than it ever was in China\(^ {94}\).

Yet the major push in the internationalisation of the Chinese education system, undoubtedly came with the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaopeng since 1978: the Open Door Policy and the Four Modernisations. Fundamental to the reorientation of the Chinese higher education system in the latter part of the 20\(^{th}\) century, were restriction of government control and an acceptance of linkages with a diverse set of countries. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s position on higher education reads as follows:

> The key to restructuring higher education lies in eliminating excessive government control over higher education institutions, extending the decision making power of universities, and giving them more autonomy in the management of programmes and resources.\(^ {95}\)

\(^{93}\) For example: Reed (2000); and Spring (2006).
Again, in an effort to internationalise the Chinese government is choosing to minimise its role in the governance of HEIs, preferring to allow institutions to negotiate by their own devices as per the rigours of the market. HEIs are to assume this new role, however, within a framework guided by the vision of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

HEI funding reforms are, therefore, part and parcel of a 21st century approach to Chinese higher education management. Welch notes that there is a push “to encourage [Chinese] universities to diversify their income, so that they are less and less dependent on the central government”⁹⁶. And indeed, the introduction in 1993 of the Provisional Regulation for the Establishment of People-Run Schools for Higher Education, by the State Education Commission, embodies the clearest expression of this shift in regulation: education transitions from a centrally run public endeavour, to a more flexible market-oriented undertaking.

At the national level, two projects have been put in place to achieve the overall goals of internationalisation: the 211 Project and the 985 Project. These projects are similar to the recent Korean priority-funding initiatives for higher education. Both seek to allocate extra funding, in large part for graduate education and research, in order to “help them [universities] approach and reach the advanced international standards (…), so as to establish their international prestige and position among universities in the world”⁹⁷.

Introduced in 1998, several years after the 211 Project, Project 985 represents a refined articulation of this vision with funds earmarked for a much narrower grouping of universities that are expected to achieve world-class status in the 21st century. As a direct result of the 985 Project, “dual-degree programs and joint-venture campuses are now becoming increasingly common,” which is in turn, serving to promote awareness of Chinese academia throughout the world⁹⁸.

Figure 14: International Students in China by Region⁹⁹

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A few figures here help make the point. International student mobility statistics illustrate quite clearly the effects of an increasingly laissez-faire approach to the regulation of education industries. These statistics are also evidence of tacit acknowledgement by the government that international networking is essential for the betterment of the higher education system as a whole. As shown in Figure 14, between 1995 and 2006, the number of international students studying in Chinese HEIs grew five-fold. Of the 162,695 international students studying in China in 2006, 74% of them originate from Asian countries.

The emergence of a triangular pattern of student exchange in the Northeast Asia region, between Japan, Korea and China is clear. In Figure 16, we note that of the 120,930 Asian students studying in Chinese HEIs as of 2006, the most important contingents are from Korea (48%) and Japan (15%), having sent 57,504 and 18,363 students, respectively. Thus while the presence of Chinese students in HEIs throughout Asia has benefitted internationalisation strategies in those countries, so too have international students— from East Asia in particular—supported the richness of the international student body in China.

From Figure 16 it is also apparent that student flows from ASEAN member countries to the Chinese higher education system represent only a fraction of total inbound students from the Asia region. Leading in the number of students sent to Chinese HEIs in 2006, are Vietnam (7,310), Indonesia (5,652) and Thailand (5,522). As is the case with inbound students to both the Japanese and Korean higher education systems, students from ASEAN member countries are growing in China, but at a slower pace than the previously cited Japan-Korea-China trilateral network.

Although less important numerically, students from Western countries are also increasingly seeking to pursue an international education in Chinese HEIs. Figure 15 shows that between 1996 and 2006, the number of students from the US studying in

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China increased by 9,211 students. Students from Western Europe are also increasingly looking towards China as a higher education destination; both French and German students have roughly doubled in the period between 1996 and 2006.

As mentioned, added institutional flexibility in Japan and Korea has contributed to a higher number of established TNPs. The case is much the same in China; not surprisingly then, the number of TNPs established with Chinese HEIs has dramatically risen since the late 1990s. In the decade spanning 1997-2007, a total of 337 TNPs were established with HEIs throughout the world. In this instance, however, the propensity to establish networks of collaboration in Asia is not as pronounced; intra-regional TNPs within HEIs in Asia in fact accounted for only 29 programmes (8.6%) of the 2007 total. By contrast, TNPs with European institutions accounted for 53% or, 180 programmes. Countries with the most number of TNPs with Chinese counterparts, were the United Kingdom (82) and Russia (59). Colonial and political ties to both those countries are likely the cause of these high figures. From the data in Figure 17, we also note that TNPs with institutions in North America and Oceania, both rank higher in number than those with other Asian HEIs.

While inroads have been made with regard to expanding student mobility between Chinese and other Asian HEIs, this rampant growth has yet to materialise in the form of growth in intra-regional TNPs. One example, among many, of the spirit and rationale that informs ongoing and future collaborations in higher education, can be found in the language in the 2007 MOU establishing the ASEAN-China Academic Partnership:

UNDERTAKING to promote greater academic exchanges, collaborative study and research programmes on the priority areas identified by the AUN and the Chinese Universities;

CONTINUING to facilitate more international students to study at Chinese and ASEAN Universities by setting up inter-collegiate fellowship; and

ATTEMPTING to alleviate and, if possible, eliminate obstacles to, as well as constraints on, the university cooperation between the AUN and the Chinese Universities.  

Numerous policy declarations have been made on all sides to increase the number of intra-regional TNPs, yet a comprehensive analysis of the many policy statements outlining greater collaboration within both ASEAN and the East Asia is beyond the scope of this report. Enough evidence exists, though, to suggest that the figures representative of intra-regional cooperation are likely to increase in the near future.

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Figure 16: Asian Students in China

Figure 17: Accumulated Number of TNPs in China by Region

See the MOE (2007) Chinese Foreign Cooperation in Running Schools, Beijing: MOE.
3 (Re-)Conceptualising TNE Directions in Asia

This section seeks to capture the rapid growth of transnational collaboration in higher education, with a specific focus on the Asian region. Transnational networks are increasing at a steady pace, but few models have thus far been put forward which can comprehensively conceptualise their direction. The Flying Geese model presented in this section—borrowed from the field of economics—is a first interpretation of its application in the field of education. It is the first phase of an ongoing process to develop a better conceptual framework for understanding the important shifts and developments in TNE over the last few decades. By applying it to the transnational nature of higher education, this model can serve to describe the mobility patterns already discussed in this report and furthermore provide a window into possible future patterns of growth and collaboration.

The Flying Geese model highlights the increasing interconnectedness of education systems, not in terms of exploitation by a ‘hegemonic centre’ but rather, as an interconnected network of knowledge producers and consumers. With each sequential step in development, we find opportunities for refining educational products and services leading to their export forward and backward. In contrast to dependency theory, therefore—which argues that an evolving series of relationships materialise between a centre and a periphery with the outcome that the periphery is limited or excluded from re-exporting its products (knowledge or otherwise) backward into the centre—the Flying Geese model captures the exchanges between countries at the national, regional and global levels, leaving open the possibility of ‘reverse export’. As such, the Flying Geese model creates room for theoretical modelling that captures both forward and reverse exchanges in the education industry.

That being said, this model presents two clear limitations; the first is that it deals only with select education systems in the Asian region. A second limitation stems from the fact that the current iteration of this model does not take into account socio-cultural aspects that influence movement in TNE. It does, however, provide a new avenue for investigation and a launching point for more refined research into a comprehensive model for TNE in Asia and in other regions around the world.

A. Why a New Model?

Comparative educationalists seek, among other things, to objectify global and local phenomena that impact the nature, content and delivery of education. To achieve their ends, they often borrow from the social and pure sciences in an attempt to better understand their subject of inquiry. Eckstein and Noah note the importance of two criteria when seeking to assess a genre of work for its contribution to education: its capacity to provide persuasive explanations for the phenomena observed; and its capacity to inform administrators and planners in policy making. The Flying Geese (FG) model satisfies both these criteria. It does so first, by offering an explanation of how TNE networks evolve in the Asia region, and second, by offering important insights into the role governments and institutions will need to play to assure regional competitiveness does not become an obstacle to harmonisation of education systems.

In 2002, Marginson and Mollis underscored the need for “a new geopolitical cartography,” one that would trace “the flows of global effects and the patterns of imitation, difference, domination, and subordination in education policy and practice”\textsuperscript{105}. Here, the FG model can be particularly useful, as it seeks to explain the promulgation of transnational networks, not as original commodities of the education industry, but as unique, retooled, and value-added offerings. Marginson and Mollis later ask whether it is possible to envision an independent approach to the traditional comparative map of the world in China, Japan or the Islamic world\textsuperscript{106}. Clearly, we think so.

B. The FG Model

The FG model is a conceptual tool that offers the possibility to capture the aggregate movement of persons and programmes in Asia’s education industries. It is also helpful in explaining the economic rationales that motivate these movements. To offer a more detailed rendition of this model and hence, make obvious its application to the global education industry, more data remains to be collected. At present, the patterns referenced stem from data found in earlier sections of this report—namely, data on student mobility and TNPs.

The FG development model stems from an attempt to explain the growth pattern of export industries in developed and developing countries\textsuperscript{107}. Observations suggest a pattern of growth formed by a hierarchical production network, made up of industry leaders (first-tier geese) and followers (second-tier geese). Broadening this model’s application to capture two distinct phases of for instance, Japanese-led integration efforts in the Asian region, and Japanese attempts to lead regional integration in East Asia, can be illustrated by two separate gaggles of geese. Leader-follower integration is first observed historically, in the political sphere, and more recently in the economic sphere\textsuperscript{108}.

In other words, potentially existing is a pattern of regional integration based on a hierarchical leader-follower pattern or, a catch-up pattern of development. And indeed, in some countries, the production and export of domestic goods flourishes due to: (i) a catch-up pattern of industrialisation spurred on by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from capital-rich, developed countries; and (ii) from pro-trade oriented policies. Figure 18 is a simplified illustration of the original FG model.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
To appreciate the explanatory power of the FG model, it is important to remember that in trade terms, a student travelling to a foreign country is considered a consumer, whereas the country offering the education service is an exporter of services—this remains true even if the consumer is the only mobile element in the transaction.

The sequential pattern of development observed within the original FG model can be explained as follows:

Step 1. \([T1-T2]\) A second-tier country relies on the import of a refined good from a first-tier country, which boasts a mature industry, selling a refined product.

Step 2. When the demand is high enough in the importing country, the exporting country may choose to set-up an offshore production operation to better exploit the market.

Step 3. \([T2<Tx<T3]\) After an initial set-up time lag, the importing country begins to reproduce, on a small scale, a product similar to that which is being imported, and sells it primarily in its domestic market for home consumption.

Step 4. \([P,T3<Tx]\) Eventually, the need to import the original product diminishes—the import substitution stage— and the importing country now becomes the main supplier of the formerly imported good (or variant thereof).

Step 5. \([P,T3]\) An economy of scale emerges in the second-tier country as it specialises and refines the production of the good being sold in its domestic market.

Step 6. \([E,T3-T4]\) As production output increases and quality improves, export-led growth of the newly manufactured good begins.

Step 7. \([T4<Tx]\) When this final shift occurs, the second-tier country aims to export its product in one of two ways: (i) as a refined and value-added product back to the first-tier country (reverse-export); or (ii) to new markets in countries with nascent, or no comparable industries.

As shown in Figure 18, the graphical depiction of steps 1 through 7 resembles a pattern of flying geese. Yet important is the fact that between Steps 3 and 4, trade barriers may be used to prevent the import of a foreign good, consequently forcing the consumer in the domestic market to purchase the new domestically produced substitute good/service. And indeed, with respect to education services, trade barriers can appear in many forms. For example, a second-tier country may establish rigid quality assurance frameworks that lead to cumbersome administrative and legal processes, or they may block service trade negotiations in bilateral and multilateral fora. Such actions are only two examples of the trade barriers a country can erect to discourage consumers in the domestic market from purchasing education services offered by a foreign entity.

3.1 Applications and Observations

A. Trade Competition

Applying the FG model to TNE networks is useful, as it highlights possibilities for cooperation, competition and specialisation. Four observations might consequently be made; the first one relates to trade competition. Although the potential for aggressive competition between a first-tier country and regional competitors exists, Kojima suggests that countries would be best off if they pursued a policy of agreed specialisation:

There are a number of ways in which such agreed specialisation can emerge, either explicitly or de facto within a regionally integrated group, because the integration assures mutual liberalisation of trade and investment.

The pursuit of agreed specialisation builds on a classical economics approach that advocates balancing the terms of trade. In this scenario, countries and institutions would benefit by maximising the use of local factor endowments in response to global demands, thereby reducing unit costs and increasing profits. (Local factor endowments, in this case, are understood to mean anything from the uniqueness of a programme/instructor’s pedagogical approach, to more and better quality human resources—namely teachers.)

In the education services industry agreed specialisation can take the form of, inter alia, collaborative ventures, transnational and international programmes, or specialised programmes (e.g., thematically focused graduate/undergraduate training). Unit costs and profits can be literally assessed, or more broadly. A literal interpretation of lesser unit costs would see the total cost associated with teaching one student diminish, while a literal interpretation of profit would be reflected in an increase in income. A more liberal understanding of both these terms (which is more likely), suggests that an HEI engage in activities that will lessen the cost involved with achieving their aims: either becoming a world-class research institution, or providing better quality education (or both).

Individual HEIs adopt strategies of agreed specialisation when they undertake to excel in one particular field of research. They concentrate their resources on developing a unique knowledge base and research potential. At a national level, a similar approach is taken by governments seeking to promote the quality and prestige of ‘elite’ institutions. The promotion of “Centres of Excellence”, is one example of governments focusing resources to develop niche skills and competencies.

The “Centres of Excellence” approach has been adopted in Japan, Korea and China and is likely to be emulated by second-tier countries, as well. A country may engage in practices of agreed specialisation by targeting niche markets. We note, for example, that Malaysian HEIs are increasingly trying to tap into international student markets in both the Middle East and China, exploiting the naturally occurring cultural linkages between these countries and regions:

A recruitment campaign is likewise underway in the Middle East, with the Ministry of Education marketing Malaysia’s good value in comparative terms, and highlighting its socio-cultural and religious similarities with this region111.

B. Capital Flow

The second observation deals with the flow of capital, both in the form of national priority-funding schemes and FDI to underdeveloped industries in first- and second-tier countries. Since the early 1980s, regional trade in Asia has expanded at a high rate; as a result, there has been an increase in capital flows throughout the region. This increase is an enabling element of the FG model, as capital injections are a prerequisite for improving domestic industries.

In the case of Asian higher education systems, multiple instances of priority-funding schemes have resulted in significant injections of capital so as initiate the catch-up process necessary for developing world-class HEIs and research networks. In terms of the FG model, therefore, priority-funding schemes function as injections of capital to an underdeveloped industry.

The first-tier countries in Asia, such as Japan, Singapore and China, typically fund injections of capital via reallocations of their national budgets. Second-tier countries, however, receive FDI investments in conjunction with supplementary funding arising from the reshuffling of national budgets. Recent changes in ODA strategies in Japan, China and Korea are aimed at improving the higher education systems in what can be considered second-tier countries, for instance. Similar schemes are undertaken within ASEAN; in fact, Singapore’s initiatives here often place it at the helm of the ASEAN gaggle of flying geese.

C. Evolutionary Transnational Activity

A third observation made by applying the FG model concerns the evolution of transnational activities. Universities and governments alike have encouraged the promulgation of TNE activities in a manner that is analogous with the FG model: importing a foreign research/pedagogical model, retooling it to suit their unique circumstances, and exporting their lessons of experience along with niche skills and competencies to second-tier countries, and via reverse-exports to first-tier countries. In one example of transnational transmission via the FG pattern, the Dearing Report found that “Asian tigers” are following Japan’s lead in funding models for basic research in order to secure long-term economic growth112.

Transnational activities were initially aimed at attracting international students, a rudimentary export of services. Yet as higher education systems specialised and refocused their offerings, they developed more ambitious service products and

strategies. These range from offering ICT-enabled education services to establishing a more robust physical presence abroad in the form of centres, liaison and recruitment offices, and branch campuses. The net result has been that education services and end products have become increasingly varied over time.

Figure 19: Figure Foreign Based Centres Established by Japanese Universities by Region and According to the Period of Establishment

For instance, the number of branch centres Japanese universities operate overseas increased from fewer than 20 to 182 between 1997 and 2008, the majority of which are located in second-tier Asian countries (China – 57; Thailand – 29; South Korea – 19; and Indonesia – 14). As the FG model predicts, Japan, once a heavy importer of education services, now exploits markets in second-tier countries within its own gaggle of geese, and has begun a pattern of reverse-export into the traditionally dominant countries/regions (US, Western European countries, and Oceania), mainly through the establishment of branch centres.

D. Student Mobility

Our final observation deals with student mobility. The FG model predicts that as the quality of research networks and institutions in second-tier countries improve, domestic consumers (students) will be encouraged to invest in their domestic market (domestic HEIs), as opposed to importing a foreign service (study abroad). In other words, students are likely to increasingly study in their respective national higher education systems, rather than consuming higher education services offered by a foreign country. This transition is captured in steps 3 and 4 of the FG model.

Recent student mobility figures show tentative drops in the number of students leaving Asia to study in traditionally dominant higher education systems in the West. Coinciding with this cautious drop is exponential growth in the number of students studying within Asia. What this means is that students are not necessarily going abroad in larger numbers, but those who do choose to go abroad are increasingly choosing to study at

113 Figure reproduced from MEXT (2006) Daigakukan kouryu kyoutei teiketsu jyoukyo chousa (Situational research on university exchange agreements), Tokyo: MEXT.
institutions in Asia. Student flows within the region are thus mimicking the export/import arcs characteristic of FG pattern industry development.

HEIs in Asia are building on imported educational models; either from the West or from more advanced education systems within the Asian region itself. Each country has successively borrowed from a first-tier country and in turn specialised, developing respective niche export markets. The FG model suggests the emergence of a number of diversified niche markets as flight paths continue to promulgate from country to country.

Internationalisation processes have set countries in the region on a firm path toward retooling their higher education offerings and constitute a driving force of the flying geese. Traditional centres now find that collaboration or association with emerging world-class research centres—formerly in the periphery—represents a value-added endeavour. Furthermore, by entering into transnational partnerships, second-tier countries benefit not only from exploiting a new export market, but also from an opportunity to achieve increased specialisation. By developing specialised TNPs with foreign HEIs, the global student market can be further exploited based on unique national affinities and institutional strengths. Peng concludes that post-WW2 FG pattern of development resulted in informally integrating the economies of the region via production networks:

The regional production network in East Asia is a form of informal economic integration. It involves no formal institution or intergovernmental agreement but works according to a transnational logic.\textsuperscript{114}

We find that a comparable transnational logic has taken hold with respect to higher education in the Asian region, resulting in de facto integration of higher education systems despite the marked absence of a pan-regional intergovernmental agreement and/or harmonisation framework. Recognition of this de facto integration of higher education systems has been slow; yet the establishment of a pan-regional framework is now essential if harmonisation is to occur in a healthy and equitable manner.

3.2 Education and Trade Services

An inherent contradiction besets HEIs; on the one hand, there is an agenda to educate for education’s sake. On the other, in many instances education can be described as a commodity that is perpetually being reinventing to remain palatable to an ever-changing and ever-growing sea of consumers. Where a nation’s workforce is concerned, it also serves the immediate and planned manpower needs of government and industry.

The model proposed above has sought to describe the evolution of cross-border education in terms of a commodity that operates within a global and regional education industry. We have already shown that increases in student mobility and collaborative networks are the result of carefully directed strategies seeking to internationalise HEIs. Often, these new strategies can be linked to the financial gain and institutional prestige associated with a large international student body. In 2006, Vlk concluded, “during the last years cultural, political, and academic approaches to international higher education have been increasingly replaced by an economic rationale.”\textsuperscript{115}

Elsewhere, Ng Eng Hen, Minister of State for Education in Singapore, comments on the economic value of TNE and arrives at a similar conclusion:

> Reports tell us that there are nearly two million tertiary-level students who now study outside their home countries. It’s a given that foreign students bring revenue – universities do not survive on ideas and aspirations; they too need to balance their budgets. (…) It is not surprising therefore that many countries consider education services an important growth sector that should be exploited much further.\(^{116}\)

Combined with rapid advances in information technologies, globalised economies and labour forces have undoubtedly made the promulgation of higher education services a lucrative industry. With this observation in mind, we have sought to understand how this service industry has grown and spread throughout the Asian region.

Few models have ever attempted to explain the evolution of TNE in the Asian region. Dependency theory—arguably the most popular to date—is found to be lacking in insight and limited in its applicability. However, rather than accept the notion that a periphery (developing world) reproduces the values of a centre (developed world), copying and imitating content and delivery, it is our assertion that in Asia, as in other parts of the world, we are witnessing something entirely different. Proof exists by way of the fact that rather than reproducing the values of the centre, the periphery absorbs incoming information (and pedagogical methods) and reprocesses them into a local adaptation, fitted to their unique circumstances, economies, social values and histories. (The process of absorption and retooling is captured in the initial three time segments of the FG model—see Figure 18.)

Moreover, periphery countries have not had to delink from the global system to counter the inherent "colonial oppression" dependency theorists make light of; rather, they take advantage of the increasing interlinkages provided via globalisation. They do so by exporting their specialised skills and educational services back into the centre, either via unidirectional exports (receiving international students), or some form of bilateral collaboration (TNPs); these are referred to as ‘reverse export’ effects.

### 3.3 The Path to Harmonisation

Globalisation presents HEIs—and education systems as a whole—with a unique and unprecedented set of challenges and opportunities. Channels of cooperation formerly blocked by the rigidity of national borders, both imagined and real, are fading and giving way to an array of opportunities for transnational collaboration.

At the moment, regional-level collaboration is being given more weight in policy discussions and institutional strategies, one facet of which is revolving around the issue of system harmonisation. Whereas in Europe, where the Latin tradition combined with shared religious and cultural mores set the foundation for harmonisation and eventual integration, the challenge of harmonisation in Asia is compounded by the immense diversity of education systems. Achieving something similar in Asia will thus require a completely new approach.

\(^{116}\) Ministry of Education (MOE) (Singapore) (2005) *Speech by Dr. Ng Eng Hen, Acting Minister for Manpower and Minister of State for Education at the Opening Session of the 2\(^{nd}\) General Meeting on the ASEM Education Hub*, 3 November.
This approach is likely to boast more differences than similarities with respect to the European model. The underlying fact is that because Asian higher education embodies great diversity and quality gaps, the aim of any policy framework aimed at the harmonisation of education systems in this region should not seek to achieve a highly standardised higher education zone as in the European Bologna Process. In fact, as Marginson and Mollis note, it may very well be that through greater transnational collaboration, more of these diversities will surface. The goal should be then, to approach the task of harmonisation in such a fashion that distinctive features of each system remain intact, exploiting instead those points of common linkage.

3 Conclusions

This report has sought to highlight the current challenges faced by governments and HEIs in Asia with respect to TNE. Although some of the challenges faced in Asia are common to other regions of the world, we have sought to explain the Asian dimension of TNE in terms that have gained widespread use and adherence in international higher education: internationalisation, regionalisation, and globalisation.

This report has situated regional-level efforts to promote TNE in the dialectical and complimentary processes of globalisation and internationalisation. More specifically, it discusses the possibility of establishing a pan-Asian framework for education harmonisation. The dual goal of such a framework can be summarised as: (i) promoting more and increasingly diverse networks of education collaboration; and (ii) regulating the speed, depth, and healthiness of interstate and inter-institutional collaboration.

We underscore the role HEIs have played in reaching out across borders and establishing collaborative networks with institutions around the world. Government policies and frameworks often layer ongoing collaborations rather than preceding them. They seek to remedy the absence of legal frameworks, as opposed to instituting dynamic exchanges. This report also stresses that some of the most active networks of inter-institutional collaboration in the world are being built up in Asia. The high rate at which the networks are propagating is evidence of a propensity to foster the Asianisation of Asia. Student mobility rates go one step further in verifying the hypothesis that Asian higher education is severing the ties of intellectual dependency and looking inward to foster new and robust knowledge economies for the future.

In an effort to conceptualise the promulgation of transnational market behaviours from country to country, we have applied an original interpretation of an economic model to Asian higher education: the Flying Geese model of industry development builds on the notion that a commodity is imported, refined, and exported as a value-added service. Yet in its current form this model does not take into account the social and cultural patterns and structures that have important influences on TNE in Asia. The interpretation presented is based on a narrow conceptualisation of TNE, focusing on its behaviour as a market commodity.
This has enabled us to derive an explanatory model for past and possible future trends. The sequential pattern of development observed suggests four observations with regard to TNE patterns in Asia:

(i) Given increased competition between HEIs and governments to dominate world student markets, the FG model shows that by pursuing agreed specialisation HEIs can enjoy the benefits of an internationalised education system and avoid the pitfalls of competitive regionalism;

(ii) The FG model captures the effects that priority-funding schemes and foreign direct investment have on promoting TNE in Asia;

(iii) The FG model captures the development of increasingly diverse education products, delivery and outreach systems, and forecasts a continued development along these lines with additional local specificities added over time; and

(iv) At this moment in time, the FG model appears to fit with current international student mobility patterns within Asia. However, it also attempts to forecast future trends based on the improvement and retooling of educational offerings.

By exposing the weaknesses in dependency theory—one of the dominant theoretical models in international higher education—the FG model opens the path for new insights into the cross-border mobility of higher education. More importantly, the FG model does force first- and second-tier higher education systems into a pattern of exploitation and subservience. Rather, it shows how TNE networks can be used to harness channels of collaboration made available through globalisation processes. The result is that HEIs develop increasingly unique educational offerings as their networks spread in a flying geese formation.

While this forecast speaks to general regional trends, it is not a definitive prediction of future developments because (i) countries may be influenced by other developments that we cannot foresee at this point in time; and, (ii) because individual countries may choose to follow a different path than the mainstream countries in the Asian region.
## Appendix A: Summit Declarations for Education Collaboration in Asia

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Summit</th>
<th>Pertinent Articles</th>
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| 2007 | 3rd East Asia Summit | **Chairman's Statement of the 3rd East Asia Summit**  
**Article 16.** Recognising that United Nations' Alliance of Civilisations (AOC) initiative was an important means of fostering dialogue among faiths, cultures and communities; we agreed that the implementation of its recommendations would improve relations and understanding between communities in East Asia and elsewhere. We further welcomed the intention of a number of East Asian governments to collaborate on AOC-related projects, in areas such as youth exchanges, education and media training, and instructed our officials and the ASEAN Secretariat to follow up on these.  
**Article 18.** We noted with satisfaction, the progress of youth exchange in East Asia, including the steady implementation of the “Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths” (JENESYS) Programme. |
| 2007 | 2nd East Asia Summit | **Chairman's Statement of the 2nd East Asia Summit**  
**Article 7.** We agreed to strengthen regional educational cooperation, noting that we could tap the region’s centers of excellence in education for this purpose. Noting proposals to renew our historical ties, we welcomed initiatives such as the revival of the Nalanda University in India, to improve regional understanding and the appreciation of one another’s heritage and history. |
| 2005 | 1st East Asia Summit 6th ASEAN + 3 Summit | **Kuala Lumpur Declaration:**  
**Article 6.** We will enhance people-to-people exchange aimed at developing a “we” feeling.  
**Article 7.** We will encourage the sharing of ideas through greater interaction between students, academicians, researchers, artists, media, and youths among countries in East Asia.  
**Article 8.** We will conduct regular exchange of intellectuals, members of think tanks, religious personalities and scholars, which will benefit East Asia and the world through deeper knowledge and understanding so as to fight intolerance and improve understanding among cultures and civilisations. |
| 2003 | Statement by the Chairperson of the ASEAN + China Summit, the ASEAN + Japan Summit, the ASEAN + Republic of Korea Summit, and the ASEAN-India Summit | **Article 10.** We pledged our joint efforts to break the US$100 billion mark by 2005; to intensify cooperation in key areas such as agriculture, information and telecommunications, and human resources development; and to support each other's endeavour for economic growth and development. ASEAN Leaders welcomed China’s support for the economic integration of ASEAN, such as the BIMP-EAGA and Greater Mekong Sub-regional Cooperation (GMS). We welcomed China’s plan to hold an ASEAN EXPO in Nanning, China, next year. We agreed to promote scientific and technological exchange as well as the establishment of network of East Asia Think Thank.  
**Article 12.** In the area of social cooperation, we agreed to continue our efforts in avoiding the SARS and other communicable diseases; to further activate exchanges in science and technology, education, HRD and culture as well as personnel exchanges; to improve the mechanisms for cooperation in these areas; and to give due importance to and strengthen youth exchanges and cooperation.  
**Article 21.** ASEAN Leaders reiterated their appreciation of the support extended to the ASEAN region by the Republic of Korea through projects under the ASEAN-ROK Special Cooperation Fund (SCF) and the Future-Oriented Cooperation Projects Fund (FOCPF). The two funds had greatly benefited the region especially in the area of environmental conservation, science and technology, information and communication technology, economic development, education, and human resources development |
| 2001 | Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the Three ASEAN + 1 Summits | **Article 16.** We were glad to hear of Japan’s continued commitment to help ASEAN in the field of training and education. We asked Prime Minister Koizumi to explore the possibility of setting up training and education institutions in various ASEAN countries. The ASEAN leaders also expressed the hope that Japan would continue offering study trips for high-school students from Southeast Asia. By giving our youth such valuable opportunities to visit Japan, such trips further enhance understanding among all of our people. They also help to raise ASEAN awareness in Japan. |
| 2001 | Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the 5th ASEAN + 3 Summit | **Article 28.** As a follow-up to our initiative in Manila in 1999, Brunei Darussalam offered to continue support to the ASEAN + 3 Young Leaders Forum. Inaugurated in Bandar Seri Begawan in August last year, the forum brought together youth leaders, academics and government officials from 13 countries to exchange ideas on strategic and political issues in the region and promote better understanding among our people. |
Resources


CHOONSIK, Y. (2009 “South Korea vows to get closer to Asian neighbours”, *Reuters*, 1 June.


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MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (MOE) (Singapore) (2003) Speech by Dr. Ng Eng Hen, Acting Minister for Manpower and Minister of State for Education at the Opening Session of the 2nd General Meeting on the ASEM Education Hub, 3 November.


------ Kyoudou gakui seido dounyu daigaku no rei (Examples of Universities with Joint Degree Programmes). Last retrieved 22 April 2009.


